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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF 
CROSS-APPEAL ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
The appellees and Cross-Appellants, Wasatch Management ("Wasatch") and 
Kenneth C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, Steven E. Jensen and Kevin J. Jensen (collectively the 
"Jensens"), contend their cross-appeal of the trial court's order refusing to award attorney's 
fees should be reviewed for "patent error or clear abuse of discretion." (Aplee. Br. at 1.) 
The proper standard of review, however, is correction of error, with no deference accorded 
to the trial court's determination. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) 
("Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which we review 
for correctness.") 
The standard of review invoked by Wasatch and the Jensens concerns a trial court's 
determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee. The trial court did not reach that issue 
because, it determined, Wasatch and the Jensens had no statutory or contractual right to an 
award of attorney's fees. (R. 892, 893.) 
REPLY TO APPELLEES5 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wasatch and the Jensens have offered a "Statement of Facts" that appears to be a 
verbatim reproduction (including the use of plaintiff and defendants to refer to the parties) 
of the "Findings of Fact" they prepared in connection with the trial court's order of summary 
judgment in their favor. Many of those "facts," however, are actually conclusions of law. 
Paragraphs 5 through 9 of Wasatch and the Jensens' "Statement of Facts" constitute 
legal conclusions concerning the Combined Agreement's treatment of the interests of Orlob 
and Professionals Control Group ("PCG"). There is nothing factual about the conclusions 
in paragraphs 5 through 9 that the Combined Agreement treats Orlob and PCG "collectively." 
Because the trial court ruled on summary judgment and without consideration of any 
extrinsic evidence, that is a legal issue before this Court on appeal. 
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The "Statement of Facts" is also more broadly flawed because Wasatch and the 
Jensens have not cited to the record in support of any of the proffered facts. Indeed, nowhere 
in their response brief have Wasatch and the Jensens made reference to the record. 
Citations to the record are required under Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987) 
(applying Rule 24(a) of the Rules of Utah Court of Appeals). The Court of Appeals "'need 
not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record.'" Id. 
(quoting Uckerman v. Lincoln Natl Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978)). 
Moreover, Rule 24(a)(5)(A) specifically requires each appellant to make "citation to the 
record showing the issue was preserved in the trial court;. . ." 
Wasatch and the Jensens have not satisfied their obligations under Rule 24. As such, 
they have offered no facts in opposition to Orlob's motion for partial summary judgment, no 
facts in support of their motion for summary judgment on Orlob's claims, and no facts in 
support of their cross-appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING CROSS-APPEAL 
The "Statement of Facts," as noted above, appears to be a reproduction of the trial 
court's "Findings of Fact" in connection with the entry of summary judgment in favor of 
Wasatch and the Jensens. No other facts are proffered. Because the cross-appeal concerns 
only attorney's fees, and that issue was addressed in a separate order, the trial court's 
"Findings of Fact" are entirely inapposite to this cross-appeal. Thus, Wasatch and the 
Jensens' "Statement of Facts" contains no facts of any kind, including any reference to the 
language of the Combined Agreement, in support of their cross-appeal on the trial court's 
refusal to award attorney's fees. 
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Orlob submits the following facts in response to Wasatch and the Jensens' cross-
appeal: 
1. Paragraph 21 of the Combined Agreement provides as follows: 
Parties further acknowledge that in the event of a default the 
non-defaulting party shall be entitled to all costs, including 
reasonable attorney fees, to enforce the terms and conditions of 
this Agreement against the defaulting party. Each party further 
acknowledges that this Agreement represents all of the terms 
and conditions, understanding and duties of the parties and that 
there are no other agreements not contained within this 
Agreement. [R. 049, 056; emphasis added.] 
2. Orlob filed a memorandum in opposition to Wasatch and the Jensens' motion 
for attorney's fees. (R. 825-62.) 
4. Wasatch and the Jensens did not file a reply memorandum in support of their 
motion for attorney's fees. 
5. The trial court denied Wasatch and the Jensens' motion for attorney's fees due 
to the lack of statutory or contractual right to the same. (R. 892, 893.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court's Denial of Orlob's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Should be Reversed. 
A. Orlob's Statement of Facts Supporting Summary Judgment is 
Undisputed. 
In their response brief, Wasatch and the Jensens have chosen to focus their discussion 
almost exclusively on whether they are entitled to summary judgment. (See Aplee. Br. at 7-
12.) They have devoted only two-thirds of one page of their discussion to Orlob's appeal 
seeking reversal of the denial of Orlob's motion for partial summary judgment on liability 
(breach of contract). (See Aplee. Br. at 12.) 
With respect to Orlob's appeal from the denial of his motion for partial summary 
judgment, Wasatch and the Jensens do not even discuss specific facts in an attempt to raise 
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a genuine issue of material fact. Rather, they assert, incorrectly, that Orlob must "marshal 
evidence" in support of the trial court's ruling. {Id.) They further assert, also incorrectly, 
that the "District Court's factual findings will not be disturbed unless it can be shown that 
those findings are clearly erroneous. (Id., citing Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&LAuto, Inc., 2000 
UT83,1|9, 12P.3d580, 582.) 
There has been no trial on the merits, and therefore Orlob has no duty to marshal the 
evidence. See Crisman v. Hallows, 2000 UT App 104, If 8 n. 3, 999 P.2d 1249, 1251 
("Because on motion for summary judgment the court does not make findings of fact, but 
rather determines only whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based 
upon the undisputed material facts, we reject defendant's argument that plaintiffs were 
required to marshal the evidence to attack what the court labeled as findings of fact.") 
This appeal arises from the trial court's denial of Orlob's motion for partial summary 
judgment and entry of summary judgment in favor of Wasatch and the Jensens. Under such 
circumstances, a trial court's "findings of fact" are "clearly inappropriate." Buzas Baseball, 
Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996). "By definition, summary 
judgment cannot be granted where there are disputed facts." Id. See also, Dubois v. Grand 
Central, 872 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah App. 1994) (stating "a court should not make findings 
of fact in a summary judgment other than a restatement of the undisputed facts stated in favor 
of the nonmoving party."). Consequently, the trial court should not have entered "findings 
of fact" since it ruled as a matter of law. Those "findings of fact" are not, as Wasatch and 
the Jensens contend, subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review; rather, because the 
entry of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness, the trial court's ruling is accorded 
no deference. See Crisman, 999 P.2d at 1250. 
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Thus, to at least attempt to avoid reversal of the trial court's ruling denying partial 
summary judgment, it was incumbent upon Wasatch and the Jensens to point to record 
evidence capable of raising a genuine issue of material fact, or otherwise to explain why 
Orlob was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. However, Point II of their response 
brief, in which Orlob's motion for partial summary judgment is addressed, does not point to 
controverting evidence of any kind. Accordingly, the facts set forth in Orlob's statement of 
facts are undisputed. Those undisputed facts (all of which were undisputed in the trial court 
as well) can be summarized as follows: 
• A true and correct copy of the Combined Agreement is attached as Exhibit A 
to Orlob's opening brief (See also, R. 049-59.) 
• All of PCG's assets were transferred to Wasatch and the Jensens pursuant to 
the Combined Agreement. (Aplee. Br. at 4, f 5.) 
• PCG transferred ownership of its equipment and physician contracts. (Id., f 4.) 
• PCG ceased operations after the Combined Agreement was signed on or about 
August 1,1988, and was dissolved as a Utah corporation in or about February 
1990. (Id at 5,110.) 
• Wasatch and the Jensens made all payments under the Combined Agreement 
by checks payable to Orlob personally. (Aplt. Br. at 7,]f 6.) 
• Wasatch and the Jensens continued to make payments under the Combined 
Agreement by checks payable to Orlob personally after PCG was dissolved. 
(Id) 
• Wasatch and the Jensens purchased PCG's interest in the Combined 
Agreement at an IRS auction on December 10, 1990. (Id. at 6, f 14.) 
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• Wasatch and the Jensens ceased making payments under the Combined 
Agreement after the IRS auction. (R. 432.) 
B. Orlob is Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law. 
In his opening brief, Orlob set forth the legal standards governing this appellate 
review of the trial court's interpretation of the Combined Agreement as a matter of law. 
(Aplt. Br. at 11-12.) Wasatch and the Jensens have not objected to that recitation of the law. 
In his opening brief, Orlob also examined the contract language. (Aplt. Br. at 12-17.) 
No part of that discussion will be repeated here because, in their response brief, Wasatch and 
the Jensens do not challenge, and thereby effectively concede, the argument made by Orlob. 
Orlob herein refers to Point I.B.I, of his opening brief, wherein the analysis of the contract 
language is set forth fully. Since the payments for the non-competition were made 
exclusively to Orlob, individually, there can be no dispute that Orlob, individually, held a 
contractual right to receive all such payments. The trial court placed exclusive reliance on 
the introductory paragraph of the Combined Agreement.1 (R. 779-80; R. 913, at 33-34.) 
The trial court erred when it disregarded other language within the four corners of the 
contract that clarifies the ambiguity created by the introductory paragraph. Harmonizing all 
of the contract language, including the signature page, the parties intended to include Orlob 
as an individual party to the Combined Agreement's terms. Thus, the introductory paragraph 
should be construed to mean the Orlob "Group" consists of PCG and/or Orlob. References 
1
 Wasatch and the Jensens assert the trial court relied on other provisions of the 
contract as well. (Aplee. Br. at 7-8.) However, they do not support their bare assertion 
by pointing to any instance where the trial court even mentioned other language. In fact, 
at the oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court referred 
only to the introductory paragraph. (R. 113, at 33-34.) Its findings of fact also refer only 
to the introductory paragraph (R. 779-82.) Therefore, in ruling as a matter of law without 
resort to extrinsic evidence, it must be presumed the trial court placed exclusive reliance 
on the introductory paragraph of the Combined Agreement. That failure to harmonize all 
provisions explains in part the court's erroneous conclusion. 
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in the body of the contract to "Orlob" must include, or mean only, Orlob in his individual 
capacity, and references to "Professional's Control Group" must mean PCG alone. 
In the event this Court concludes the Combined Agreement is ambiguous in its 
treatment of Orlob as an individual party, Orlob is still entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The extrinsic evidence, as set forth in Point LA, above, is undisputed and establishes 
the intent of the parties to include Orlob as an individual party with rights to payments for 
his covenant not to compete. See EIE v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 
1981) (holding that defendant's course of conduct of reimbursing plaintiff 90% of each bill 
rather than flat $90 fee was best indication of parties' intention). 
Wasatch and the Jensens do not dispute they terminated all payments under the 
Combined Agreement when they purchased PCG's interest at the IRS auction on December 
10, 1990. (R. 432.) Accordingly, the trial court erred when it refused to enter partial 
summary judgment in favor of Orlob. As a matter of law, Wasatch and the Jensens breached 
their obligations to make payments to Orlob under the Combined Agreement for the 
commission period December 10, 1990 through July 31, 1994. 
The trial court's denial of Orlob's motion for partial summary judgment should be 
reversed, partial summary judgment on liability should be entered, and the case should be 
remanded for a trial on damages awardable to Orlob. 
11. The Trial Court Erred When It Entered Summary Judgment in Favor of 
Wasatch and the Jensens on Orlob's Claims. 
A. Wasatch and the Jensens are Not Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of 
Law. 
As an initial matter, since partial summary judgment should be granted in favor of 
Orlob, as set forth in Point I, above, the summary judgment in favor of Wasatch and the 
Jensens necessarily should be reversed. 
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Wasatch and the Jensens devote nearly all of their response brief to justifying the trial 
court's entry of summary judgment in their favor. But they make no reference to facts in the 
record that would support their position, and they make at best scant reference to the 
language of the Combined Agreement itself. Instead, their response brief merely repeats 
their mantra of the truism that a corporation must act through its officers and directors. 
(Aplee. Br. at 8.) 
Because their argument is made without reference to any contract language, extrinsic 
evidence, relevant case, or even common sense and experience, Wasatch and the Jensens 
really ask the court to supply a factual inference,-derived from the truism that corporations 
must act through their officers and directors,-that an individual who has signed a contract 
both in his or her corporate and individual capacities, may never be intended to receive any 
of the benefits of the contract. They essentially argue from the truism that the parties must 
have intended to impose personal obligations on Orlob, but allow him no rights to payments. 
In their response brief, Wasatch and the Jensens seem to admit that Orlob was a party 
to the Combined Agreement in his individual capacity. {See, e.g., Aplee. Br. at 8 (the 
Combined Agreement "bind[s] Orlob individually to perform the terms of the contract on 
behalf of PCG, ..."), at 11 ("the covenant not to compete in the instant case plainly and by 
its express terms bound both the Plaintiff and PCG.") This construction of the Combined 
Agreement was apparently adopted by the trial court in its conclusions of law. (R. 783, "by 
its terms, the Combined Agreement seeks to bind the Plaintiff Orlob as the individual 
responsible for carrying out the obligations set forth therein on behalf of PCG.") In the trial 
court, and again in their response brief, Wasatch and the Jensens have offered no reported 
case to support their novel proposition that an individual can have enforceable obligations 
under a contract, yet have no enforceable rights thereunder. Indeed, Wasatch and the Jensens 
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have taken this proposition to its extreme level, and contend that, aside from the initial 
transfer of PCG's assets (equipment and physician contracts), PCG had no further obligations 
under the Combined Agreement. Rather, Orlob, individually, was obligated to perform the 
contract over the ten year term of the covenant not to compete. (Aplee. Br. at 8, "It is 
abundantly clear from the contract itself that Plaintiff Orlob was included as a separate 
signatory so that some person would be required to undertake the obligations of the corporate 
entity.") 
Paragraph 6 of the Combined Agreement unambiguously provided that, in exchange 
for the payment of commissions over a term of nearly six years, "Orlob further agrees and 
warrants he will not compete directly or indirectly in Utah against or adverse to Jensens in 
the billing and collection business for a period often years commencing August 1, 1988." 
2
 (R. 050.) (Emphasis added.) The issue is whether Orlob, individually, had the right to 
receive payments under the Combined Agreement in exchange for his obviously personal 
covenant not to compete. Wasatch and the Jensens allege they were entitled, under the 
Combined Agreement, to enforce the covenant not to compete against Orlob, individually, 
but he had no rights to receive payments, individually, for not operating a billing and 
collection business in Utah for a period often years. 
As Orlob explained in his opening brief, the fundamental flaw in Wasatch and the 
Jensens' argument is the absence of any consideration of good will. (See Aplt. Br. at 17-21.) 
Wasatch and the Jensens became the owners of PCG's physician contracts after the sale, but 
they could not retain the value of those contracts without a covenant not to compete on the 
2This was a provision Wasatch and the Jensens wanted because of the personal 
goodwill Orlob had created in his dealings with the doctors. Without the covenant from 
Orlob, he could open another billing practice and exploit his personal goodwill. PCG was 
left with no assets and no business after the sale. It was effectively dead and later 
dissolved. 
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part of Orlob, individually. The physician contracts concerned the provision of billing and 
collection services, which is a fungible service, and could have been provided by a number 
of different service providers. This condition is evidenced by the fact that the contracts could 
be terminated with 90 days' (and in some cases 30 days') notice. (R. 469-99.) As such, the 
only property interest PCG had in the contracts, and the only property Wasatch and the 
Jensens purchased, was the good will that PCG had established with the physicians. 
Orlob was exclusively responsible for creating the contractual relationships between 
PCG and the physicians, and, more importantly, for retaining the physicians as clients. In 
other words, the good will of the physician contracts inhered in the person of Orlob. 
Knowing this, Wasatch and the Jensens required Orlob to sign the Combined Agreement in 
his individual capacity in order to bind him to paragraph 6, the covenant not to compete. 
Although Wasatch and the Jensens are correct in noting that a corporation can only 
act through its agents (Aplee. Br. at 8.), that general principle is unavailing to them in light 
of the transferability of good will. The leading case in Utah on the concept of good will is 
Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823 (Utah 1951). There the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized a protectible interest on the part of an employer in the good will of the business. 
Id. At 827. The salient fact in that case was the special relationship that existed between the 
employee-pharmacist-manager and the employer's customers. This special relationship 
created good will, which was a valuable property of the business. Id. at 616-17. But "when 
the individual responsible for creating the good will and the business to which it attaches, 
become separated, it is necessary to preserve that good will to the business by a covenant in 
an area where his personal reputation will detach the old customers from the old business." 
M a t 617. 
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All of PCG's assets were transferred to Wasatch and the Jensens under the Combined 
Agreement dated August 1, 1988. (R. 042; R. 063.) With no assets, PCG ceased doing 
business at approximately the same time, and was eventually dissolved as a Utah corporation 
in January 1990. (R. 459; R. 781.) Wasatch and the Jensens began servicing the physician 
contracts when the Combined Agreement became effective. (R. 427-28.) The reasonable 
inference to which Orlob is entitled and which the payments to him individually support, is 
that PCG could not compete, because it was defunct, and Orlob was in fact the intended 
beneficiary of the covenant not to compete payments. 
After August 1, 1988, the business and the individual responsible for creating the 
good will became separated. It then became necessary to preserve the good will to the 
business by a covenant in the area (Utah) where Orlob's personal reputation (effective 
provider of billing and collections services) would detach the old customers (physicians) 
from the old business (Wasatch and the Jensens as the successor to PCG). 
Even though Orlob, in his opening brief, emphasized the importance of good will, 
Wasatch and the Jensens do not mention good will in their response brief. Instead, Wasatch 
and the Jensens essentially rely upon the same few inapposite cases they cited to the trial 
court in support of their contention that a corporation is only capable of acting through its 
officers and directors. (Aplee. Br. at 8.) 
However, this general proposition has no bearing on the issue in question because it 
does not answer the question of how Orlob could, as Wasatch and the Jensens contend, have 
individual obligations under the Combined Agreement but, at the same time, not have 
individual rights to receive payments. It does not answer the question of how Orlob, as the 
officer and director of PCG, could be individually obligated to perform the contractual 
obligations of the corporation after he effectively separated from the corporation when it 
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ceased doing business on the effective date of the Combined Agreement, after he relocated 
from Utah to Los Angeles in October 1989, and after PCG was dissolved as a Utah 
corporation in January 1990. 
Wasatch and the Jensens cite, for the first time, Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346 
(Utah App. 1987), which they suggest stands for the proposition that "[w]here parties fail to 
bind corporate officers as well as the corporation itself, difficulties may arise." (Aplee. Br. 
At 9.) But, similar to the other few cases Wasatch and the Jensens cited to the trial court, this 
general proposition does not assist them.3 Horman does not show that an officer and director 
can be bound, individually, to perform obligations under a contract, without his or her 
consent, yet receive no consideration, individually. Nor does it suggest that an individual 
signatory to an agreement that was additionally signed in a corporate capacity cannot, as a 
matter of law, receive some or all of the fruits of the agreement. Nor does that case explain 
or in any way account for all payments having in fact been made to Orlob, individually. 
Horman is inapposite, and concerned enforcement of a series of promissory notes in 
connection with a series of convoluted transactions. 
Wasatch and the Jensens contend that the "difficulty" with Orlob's position "is that 
he is unable to identify in any fashion the manner in which his alleged interest in the contract 
and PCG's interest in the contract should be allocated." (Aplee. Br. at 9.) 
Allocation is a red herring. Orlob individually gave a covenant not to compete for 
which he and he alone was to be paid. All payments that were in fact made for the covenant 
not to compete were in fact made to Orlob, individually, by Wasatch and the Jensens. PCG 
effectively ceased doing business from the moment the Combined Agreement was signed, 
3
 Wasatch and the Jensens provide no page reference within the Horman 
decision indicating that that court ever stated such a general proposition. Nor does the 
decision state as much. 
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and somewhat later was actually dissolved for failure to file an annual report, and could not 
compete. Orlob is entitled to all the non-competition benefit. 
Even if Wasatch and the Jensens had proffered a fact into the record contrary to 
Orlob's entitlement to all such funds, which they did not, Orlob would still be entitled to a 
reasonable inference that if one-half the non-compete obligation was PCG's and one-half his 
individually, that he should receive at least half. The fact of the payments themselves being 
made entirely to Orlob, individually, establishes the true situation. 
Moreover, that question goes to damages, which are not an issue in this appeal. The 
issue in this appeal concerns Orlob's rights, individually, to receive payments under the 
Combined Agreement, and Wasatch and the Jensens' breach of their obligations to make 
those payments. The undisputed evidence shows that Wasatch and the Jensens made no 
further payments to Orlob after the IRS auction. (R. 432.) Accordingly, the fact finder 
should determine Orlob's damages arising from the breach. 
In any event, Wasatch and the Jensens have, through their undisputed conduct, 
already pointed to the value of Orlob's rights to payments. They made full commission 
payments to Orlob individually from the commencement of the commission period on 
October 1, 1988, and continued to make full commission payments to Orlob after PCG was 
dissolved as a Utah corporation in January 1990. (R. 732-44.) Wasatch and the Jensens 
obviously understood that, after they initially paid $15,000 to PCG for its equipment, all 
further payments should be allocated to Orlob, individually. This approach is consistent with 
Wasatch and the Jensens' own understanding that, after the equipment and physician 
contracts were transferred, all further obligations were to be performed by Orlob in his 
individual capacity. (Aplee. Br. at 8.) 
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Wasatch and the Jensens contend they would, under Orlob's construction of the 
Combined Agreement, be obligated to make payments twice for the same covenant not to 
compete. (Aplee. Br. at 10.) This argument attempts to distort the actual facts and again 
misapprehends the doctrine of good will. Wasatch and the Jensens paid Orlob for the 
covenant not to compete because, when he separated from PCG on the effective date of the 
Combined Agreement, he carried with him the potential to deprive Wasatch and the Jensens 
of the fruits of their contract to purchase the physician contracts. Orlob had created the good 
will, and he could therefore detach the old customers from the old business. There was no 
real need for PCG not to compete, because it could not anyway where it no longer had assets. 
Only Orlob, individually, was in a position to compete. 
In any event, the argument is specious. The Combined Agreement calls for certain 
sums to be paid for the non-compete obligation and both PCG and Orlob signed the 
Combined Agreement. Wasatch and the Jensens would have a defense of payment if they 
had in fact paid, and any remaining dispute would have to be between PCG and Orlob. Since 
PCG was never intended to survive the Combined Agreement, however, even that scenario 
would have been impossible. 
Further, Wasatch and the Jensens' obligations to make separate payments to PCG and 
Orlob, individually, under the Combined Agreement arise from the different obligations of 
the latter parties. PCG agreed to transfer all its assets to Wasatch and the Jensens. Orlob, 
individually, agreed to cooperate in the transfer of the physician contracts, and not to 
compete for the right to provide billing and collection services in Utah for a period of ten 
years. Thus, Wasatch and the Jensens were not obligated to make payments twice. Instead, 
they were obligated to pay PCG for one type of performance and Orlob for another type. 
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As the movant for summary judgment, Wasatch and the Jensens "must establish a 
right to judgment based on the applicable law as applied to an undisputed material issue of 
fact." Ron Shepherd Insur., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994). They have 
utterly failed to do so and, in any event, disputed facts would prohibit summary judgment in 
favor of Wasatch and the Jensens, as shown below. 
B. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Preclude Summary Judgment in Favor 
of Wasatch and the Jensens. 
1. The trial court's "Findings of Fact'' have no preclusive effect in this 
appeal from an order of summary judgment. 
Wasatch and the Jensens' failure to provide references to the record is in keeping with 
their apparent assumption that the trial court's "Findings of Fact" have some preclusive or 
persuasive effect on this appeal. (Aplee. Br. at 12, "The District Court's factual findings will 
not be disturbed unless it can be shown that those findings are clearly erroneous.") 
In reviewing the entry of summary judgment in favor of Wasatch and the Jensens, the 
trial court's ruling is reviewed for correctness, and no deference is accorded the trial court's 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. Pierce v. Pierce, 2000 UT 7,118,994 P.2d 193,198. 
Thus, in this appeal, Orlob is not required to controvert the trial court's "Findings of Fact," 
as Wasatch and the Jensens appear to suggest. Rather, he is merely required to point to any 
record evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). 
2. The extrinsic evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact. 
As to their course of conduct, Wasatch and the Jensens respond they made payments 
under the Combined Agreement to Orlob in his individual capacity because he was "the sole 
owner of PCG." (Aplee. Br. at 12.) As with so many of the arguments of Wasatch and the 
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Jensens, it is difficult to discern a relevant point here, but apparently they make no distinction 
between PCG and Orlob. 
The general rule, however, "is that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from 
its officers, shareholders and directors " Redeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah 
App. 1998). Consequently, any payment made payable to "David L. Orlob" was not payment 
to PCG. For that to occur, Wasatch and the Jensens would have had to make the checks 
payable to PCG. They did not, and in fact every check made a part of the record (R. 732-44) 
is made payable to "David L. Orlob." 
Thus, Wasatch and the Jensens provide no real response to Orlob's showing that their 
course of conduct reveals their clear understanding that they were obligated under the 
Combined Agreement to make payments to Orlob, individually. Wasatch and the Jensens' 
course of conduct is the best indication of their meaning and intent with respect to the 
Combined Agreement. See EIEy 638 P.2d at 1195. Orlob is entitled to all reasonable 
inferences that flow in his favor from those payments being made to him, personally. 
Accordingly, the payments from Wasatch and the Jensens to Orlob, personally, for more than 
two years after the effective date of the Combined Agreement, and until the IRS auction in 
December 1990, raise a genuine issue of material fact that preclude summary judgment. The 
trial court erred when it failed to recognize the existence of disputed facts, and entered 
summary judgment in favor of Wasatch and the Jensens. 
III. The Trial Court's Ruling Denying Wasatch and the Jensens5 Request for 
Attorney's Fees Should Be Affirmed. 
Wasatch and the Jensens cross-appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for 
attorney's fees under the Combined Agreement. In the event this Court agrees with Orlob, 
and the trial court's ruling of summary judgment in favor of Wasatch and the Jensens is 
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reversed, the cross-appeal on the denial of an award of attorney's fees is not ripe. In that 
case, Wasatch and the Jensens would not be prevailing parties. 
In Utah, "attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by contract." 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); see 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5 (1986). "Those requesting an attorney fees award under a 
contract must show that the contract's provisions contemplate that award." Maynard v. 
Wharton, 912 P.2d 446, 451 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996). The 
"attorney fees authorized by contract are awardable only in accordance with the explicit 
terms of the contract and only to the extent permitted by the contract." Id. The burden is on 
the party requesting an attorney fees award under a contract to "show that the contract's 
provisions contemplate that award." Id. 
Wasatch and the Jensens moved the trial court for an award of attorney's fees under 
paragraph 21 of the Combined Agreement. Paragraph 21 provides that the "Parties further 
acknowledge that in the event of a default the non-defaulting party shall be entitled to all 
costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to enforce the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement against the defaulting party." Thus, paragraph 21 contemplates an award subject 
to a two-part showing: (1) the respondent is a party; and (2) a default has been proven and 
enforcement sought. 
By its plain terms, paragraph 21 allows a party to the Combined Agreement to recover 
attorney's fees as costs only "in the event of a default." In its "Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law," however, the trial court never found that Orlob, individually, was a 
"defaulting party" under the Combined Agreement, and never found that Wasatch and the 
Jensens were a "non-defaulting party" in relation to Orlob. As such, there is no basis for an 
award of attorney's fees as costs under paragraph 21. 
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The case of Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292 (Utah App. 1989), is directly on 
point. There, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's award of fees because the 
defendant "took an entirely defensive posture." Id., at 1296. Since the agreement only 
allowed fees to a party "enforcing this agreement," no fees were awardable to the prevailing 
defendant. See id. Here, as in Carr, we are not dealing with a prevailing parties provision, 
but a proof of default and enforcement provision. 
The trial court concluded, and Wasatch and the Jensens have repeated on appeal, that 
Orlob has no enforceable interest in the Combined Agreement separate from PCG. {See 
Conclusions of Law, R. 778, 782-84.) In essence, the trial court ruled that Orlob, 
individually, was not a party to the Combined Agreement. 
Thus, because the Court has effectively ruled that Orlob, individually, was not a party 
to the Combined Agreement, Wasatch and the Jensens are not entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees under paragraph 21 of the Combined Agreement. Stated differently, Orlob 
cannot be liable for attorney's fees under a contractual provision that is not enforceable by 
or against him, individually. See Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 91-92 (Utah App. 
1998) (affirming trial court's denial of award of attorneys' fees to a third party beneficiary 
because the terms "party" and "parties" in the attorney fees provision was, in the context of 
the entire contract, limited to the signatories to the contract). 
CONCLUSION 
David L. Orlob respectfully requests the following relief: 
1. That the trial court's order denying Orlob's motion for partial summary 
judgment on Orlob's claims be reversed, and this action be remanded to the trial court with 
instructions to enter partial summary judgment in favor of Orlob on his claims that he has an 
enforceable interest in the Combined Agreement that survived the IRS auction of PCG's 
18 
interest therein, if any, and Wasatch and the Jensens breached their obligations to make 
payments to Orlob under the Combined Agreement in exchange for Orlob's covenant not to 
compete; 
2. Concomitantly or alternatively, that the trial court' s order granting Wasatch and 
the Jensens' motion for summary judgment on Orlob's claims be reversed because Wasatch 
and the Jensens are not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, including without 
limitation for the reason that genuine issues of material fact exist; and 
3. That the trial court's order refusing to award attorney's fees to Wasatch and 
the Jensens be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of July, 2001. 
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